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Abstract: State-machine-based replication is an effective way to increase the availabil ity and dependability of mission-critical 
applications. However, all practical applications contain some degree of non-detenninism. Consequently, ensuring strong 
replica consistency in the presence of application non-delcmlinism has been one of the biggest challenges in bu ilding 
dependable di stributed systems. In th is Study, the authors propose a classification of common types of application non­
detenninism with respect to the requirement of achieving Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT), and present the design and 
implementation of a BFT framework that controls these types of non-dctcnninism in a systematic manner. 
Introduction 
State-machine-based Byzantine fault tolerance (BFT) [1 - 4] 
is a promising approach to increasing the dependability of 
mission-critical applications in the presence of malicious 
attacks and other types of fau lts. The BFT algorithms 
employed in such an approach require the replicas to 
operate detenninistically, that is given the same request 
under the same state, all replicas of the server produce the 
same reply and transition to the same state. However, all 
practical applications contain some degree of non­
detenninism. When such applications are replicated to 
achieve fault and intrusion tolerance, their non-detenninistic 
operations must be controlled to ensure replica consistency. 
Furthennore, unique to the Byzantine fault model, some 
types of non-detemlinism, if not properly handled, can be 
exploited to compromise the integrity of the services 
provided. 
To the best of our knowledge, only the most simplistic 
types of non-delemlinism have been handled for the 
Byzantine fault model (1- 4], which we tenn 'wrappable 
non-detennin ism' and ' verifiable pre-deternlinable non­
dctenninism'. The fomler means thai the non-detenninistic 
operation and its side-effects can be mapped into some pre­
specified abstract operations and state, which arc 
detenninistic. The latter means that non-detenninistic values 
can be detennined prior to the execution of a request, and 
the values proposed by one replica can be verified by other 
replicas in a detenninistic manner, and accepted if they are 
believed to be correct. 
The mechanisms designed to handle these types of non­
detenninism [1- 4] either are not effective in guaranteeing 
replica consistency and/or are not effective in masking 
Byzantine faults, if the application to be replicated exhibits 
other types of non-detemlinistic behavior. For example, 
many online gaming app lications contain non-detemlinistic 
va lues (e.g. random numbers that deternline the state of the 
applications) that are proposed by one replica but cannot be 
veri fied by another replica. 11 is dangerous to treat Ihis type 
of non-detenninism in the same way as verifiable pre­
detemlinable non-detenninism (VPRE) because a faulty 
replica could use a predictable algorithm to update its 
internal state and collude with its clients without being 
detected, which would defeat the purpose of applying 
existing BFT mechanisms. As another example, multi­
threaded applications exhibit non-detenninistic values (e.g. 
thread interleaving) that cannot be delemlined prior to the 
execution of a request (without losing conculTCncy), which 
cannot be handled by existing BFT mechanisms. 
This paper makes several contributions: 
• We introduce a classification of common types of replica 
non-delemlinism present in many applications. The 
classification is based on two criteria: whether or not the 
non-dctemlinistic opcrations can be detennined prior to 
the execution of a request, and whether or not the values 
associated with the non-deterministic operations sent by one 
replica can be verified by another replica. This classification 
leads to four types of non-detenninism: VPRE, non­
verifiable pre-determinable non-determinism (N PRE), 
verifiable post-determinable non-detenninism (VPOST), and 
non-verifiable post-detenninable non-detemlinism (NPOST). 
• We describe a set of mechanisms that can be used to 
control these Iypes of non-detenninistic operations. To cope 
with non-veriﬁable pre-determinable non-determinism, we 
propose to rely on the collective input from a quorum of 
replicas, and a Byzantine agreement [5] step to ensure that 
all non-faulty replicas agree on the same set of values. To 
cope with NPOST, we propose to launch a monitoring 
process prior to the execution at a backup and to compare 
the generated reply message with the one supplied by the 
primary. 
† We have implemented the mechanisms and integrated 
them into a well-known BFT framework [1–4]. We present 
the results of our performance evaluation of the working 
prototype, which show that our mechanisms introduce very 
moderate runtime overhead. 
2 Background 
In this section, we present background information related to 
this research. First, we describe the fault models, then we 
cover several replication techniques commonly used to 
achieve fault tolerance under various fault models, together 
with the concept of strong replica consistency. Next, we 
discuss how the fault tolerance mechanisms are typically 
positioned in practice. Finally, we focus on the concept of 
BFT and present a popular BFT algorithm. 
2.1 Fault models 
Faults can be categorised as follows [6]: 
† Crash fault: A crash fault occurs when a component of a 
system operates correctly up to some point in time, after 
which it produces no further results. For example, when the 
power is lost, a crash fault occurs for any process running 
on the host. 
† Omission fault: An omission fault occurs when a 
component produces some results but not others. Message 
loss is an example of an omission fault. 
† Timing fault: A timing fault occurs when a component 
produces results at the wrong time, either too early or too late. 
† Commission fault: A commission fault occurs when a 
process generates incorrect results. A commission fault in 
which a process generates incorrect results that are 
intentionally designed to mislead the algorithms or other 
components of the system is an example of a Byzantine fault. 
In general, the crash fault model refers to a model in which 
a process is subject to crash, omission and timing faults, but 
not commission faults. The ‘benign fault model’ refers to a 
model in which a process is subject to non-malicious 
commission (i.e. non-Byzantine) faults, in addition to crash, 
omission and timing faults. The ‘Byzantine fault model’ 
refers to a model in which a process is subject to arbitrary 
types of faults. 
2.2 Replication techniques and strong replica 
consistency 
The basic strategy to protect an application against faults is 
replication, so that if one replica becomes faulty, another 
replica is available to provide the service. However, with 
replication comes a challenge: how to ensure that all non-
faulty replicas have consistent state. Maintaining strong 
replica consistency is important because, otherwise, the 
integrity of the system might be compromised. An example 
is shown as part of the discussion on active replication 
below. 
Common replication techniques, and mechanisms for 
ensuring strong replica consistency with respect to these 
replication techniques, are the following: 
† Active replication: Active replication is also referred to as 
state-machine replication [7]. In active replication, all replicas 
receive the client’s request, process it, generate and send back 
the reply to the client. To maintain strong replica consistency, 
all requests must be delivered in a total order to each replica. 
To understand why the total ordering of requests is necessary, 
consider the following on-line auction example. The server, 
which runs the on-line auction application, is replicated 
with two replicas R1 and R2. Two clients, C1 and C2, are 
trying to outbid each other for an item (assuming only one 
such item is available). At the closing moment of the 
auction, C1 and C2 each place a bid with the same price 
concurrently. If at R1, the bidding request m1 from C1 is 
ordered ahead of the bidding request m2 from C2, C1 
would be declared the winner of the auction by R1. On the 
other hand, if at R2, m1 and m2 are ordered differently (i.e. 
m2 is ahead of m1), C2 would be declared the winner by 
R2. If this happens, the state of the two replicas diverge 
and the integrity of the auction application is compromised, 
which might require lengthy manual resolution. If m1 and 
m2 had been totally ordered, then either C1 would have 
been declared the winner by both replicas (if m1 is ordered 
ahead of m2), or C2 would have been declared the 
winner by both replicas (if m2 is ordered ahead of m1). 
Active replication requires that each replica operates 
deterministically. In the presence of non-deterministic 
operations, inter-replica coordination is often needed to 
ensure that all replicas use exactly the same set of values 
for the non-deterministic operations, similar to the total 
ordering requirement for requests. 
† Passive replication: In passive replication [8], one of the 
replicas is designated as the leader, referred to as the 
primary, and the remaining replicas are backups. Only 
the primary processes the client’s request, and sends back 
the reply to the client. To ensure strong replica consistency 
in the presence of replica non-determinism, the primary 
must send the update of its state to the backups prior to the 
sending of the reply, or it must send both the reply and the 
state update atomically to all replicas and the client [8]. 
† Semi-active replication: Semi-active replication is a 
variation of active replication [8]. One of the replicas is 
designated as the primary, and the remaining replicas are 
designated as backups. Even though all replicas process the 
client’s request, only the primary sends back the reply to 
the client, and most importantly, the primary determines the 
total ordering of the request, records its decisions for all 
non-deterministic operations (if present), and multicasts the 
total order and decision data on the non-deterministic 
operations to the backups, which use that information to 
direct their own executions. 
† Semi-passive replication: Semi-passive replication is a 
variation of passive replication [9] in which the primary 
communicates state updates to the backups for each 
operation. The backups update their states, but do not 
perform the operations and do not produce outgoing 
messages. Semi-passive replication aims to reduce the cost 
of recovery in the case of primary failure. 
To provide BFT, we use active replication with an 
agreement algorithm based on a quorum and with a primary 
that receives messages from the clients and multicasts 
messages to the backups, which return the results to the 
clients. 
2.3 Positioning of fault tolerance mechanisms 
Regardless of the replication technique used, it is common 
practice to implement the fault tolerance mechanisms in a 
middleware layer sandwiched between the application (on 
both the server and the client sides) and the operating 
system, as shown in Fig. 1. The main advantage of this 
practice is that it cleanly separates the application logic and 
the fault tolerance logic. The application interacts with the 
fault tolerance mechanisms via a predeﬁned set of 
application programming interfaces [1] or transparently 
through library inter-positioning [10]. 
All remote interactions between the client and the 
replicated server have to go through the middleware layer. 
To control replica non-determinism, all interactions between 
the application and the operating system are mediated by 
the middleware layer as well. 
A request sent by a client to a server replica is ﬁrst received 
at the middleware layer. Then a total order is imposed on the 
message by the fault tolerance mechanisms, after which the 
request is delivered to the application if all previous 
requests have been delivered. Similarly, any non­
deterministic value is ﬁrst obtained/decided by the fault 
tolerance mechanisms and subsequently supplied to the 
application at the appropriate time. 
2.4 Byzantine Fault Tolerance 
BFT refers to the capability of a system to tolerate Byzantine 
faults. Replication techniques that rely on the input of a single 
replica, such as passive replication, semi-active replication, 
and semi-passive replication, are not appropriate for BFT, 
because that replica, if it is Byzantine faulty, might 
disseminate conﬂicting information to other replicas to 
cause replica inconsistency. Therefore active replication 
must be used. 
The most well-known BFT algorithm is due to Castro and 
Liskov [1]. The BFT algorithm is designed to support client-
server applications running in an asynchronous distributed 
environment under the Byzantine fault model. The BFT 
algorithm requires the availability of 3f + 1 replicas to 
tolerate up to f Byzantine faulty replicas. The value of f that 
should be used depends on the risk the system faces and the 
desired degree of system reliability. It is conceivable that 
f ¼ 1 would sufﬁce for many applications. Among the 
3f + 1 replicas, one of them is designated as the primary 
while the remaining replicas are backups. Note that the 
primary does not enjoy the total authority as it does in the 
replication techniques designed to cope with crash faults. 
The input from the primary is checked by other non-faulty 
replicas. If the primary is found to have disseminated 
wrong or conﬂicting messages (or no message at all for a 
sufﬁciently long duration), the primary is demoted to the 
role of a backup and another replica is selected to replace it 
using a round-robin scheme. This process is called a view 
change. 
According to the BFT algorithm, the request issued by the 
client is captured by the fault tolerance mechanism in the 
middleware layer, and is sent to the primary, which is 
responsible to orchestrate the total ordering process. The 
mechanism at the client side collects the corresponding 
replies from the server replicas until it receives a consistent 
reply from f + 1 server replicas, at which time it delivers 
the reply to the client application. This mechanism ensures 
that the reply must have been generated by a non-faulty 
replica because there are at most f faulty replicas (according 
to the assumption). Because the primary could be faulty, 
the request is multicast to all replicas if a consistent reply 
cannot be obtained from f + 1 replicas within a reasonable 
time period. 
As shown in Fig. 2, the normal operation of the BFT 
algorithm involves three phases. During the ﬁrst phase 
(called the pre-prepare phase), the primary multicasts a pre-
prepare message to the backups containing the client’s 
request, the current view number and a sequence number 
assigned to the request. A backup veriﬁes the request 
message and the ordering information. If the backup accepts 
the message, it multicasts to all other replicas a prepare 
message containing the ordering information and the digest 
of the request being ordered. This starts the second phase, 
that is the prepare phase. A replica waits until it has 
collected 2f prepare messages from different replicas 
(including the message it sent if it is a backup) that match 
the pre-prepare message before it multicasts a commit 
message to other replicas, which starts the third phase (i.e. 
commit phase). The commit phase at a replica concludes 
when the replica has received 2f matching commit 
Fig. 1 Common practice is to implement the fault tolerance mechanisms in a middleware layer sandwiched between the application and the 
operating system 
3 
Fig. 2 Normal operation of the BFT algorithm 
messages from other replicas. At this point, the request 
message has been totally ordered (i.e. all non-faulty replicas 
have reached Byzantine agreement [5]) and the message 
can be delivered to the server application if all previous 
requests have already been delivered. 
Related work 
Replica non-determinism for the crash fault model [8, 10, 11– 
18] has been studied extensively. However, there is no 
systematic classiﬁcation of common types of replica non-
determinism, and even less so for the uniﬁed handling of 
such non-determinism. Classiﬁcations of some types of 
replica non-determinism are provided by [8, 13, 14]. 
However, those types of non-determinism largely fall within 
the types of wrappable non-determinism and VPRE, with the 
exception of the non-determinism caused by asynchronous 
interrupts, which we do not address in this work. 
The replica non-determinism caused by multi-threading 
has been studied separately from other types of non-
determinism, again, under the crash fault model in [10–12, 
15, 16, 19]. These studies provide valuable insight on how 
to approach the problem of ensuring consistent replication 
of multi-threaded applications. What matters in achieving 
replica consistency is to control the ordering of different 
threads in their access to shared data. The mechanisms to 
record and replay such ordering have been developed [10], 
as have those for checkpointing and restoring the state of 
multi-threaded applications (e.g. [20]). 
As discussed in Section 2, a number of replication 
techniques, including passive replication, semi-active 
replication, and semi-passive replication [8–10], have been 
developed to cope with replica non-determinism under the 
crash fault model. In those replication techniques, the 
primary decides on the total ordering of messages and non­
deterministic values, and such decisions are not veriﬁed by 
the backups. These techniques are not applicable in the 
presence of Byzantine faults because a faulty primary could 
send conﬂicting or wrong decisions to the backups, which 
would lead to the divergence of replica state. Nevertheless, 
the previous research provides great insight on what 
operations can lead to replica non-determinism, and how to 
record and replay non-deterministic operations. 
For the Byzantine fault model, the main effort of 
controlling replica non-determinism control thus far is to 
cope with wrappable and veriﬁable pre-determinable replica 
non-determinism [1–4]. In  [1], Castro and Liskov provide 
brief but important and useful guidelines on how to 
deal with the type of non-determinism that requires 
collective determination of the non-deterministic values. 
These guidelines, however, are applicable to only a subset 
of the problems that we address. 
4 Classiﬁcation of replica non-determinism 
We distinguish replica non-determinism into the following 
three major categories: 
† Wrappable non-determinism: This type of replica non-
determinism is easily controlled by using an infrastructure-
provided or application-provided wrapper function, ‘without 
explicit inter-replica coordination’. For example, 
information such as hostnames, process ids, ﬁle descriptors, 
etc. can be determined group-wise. Another situation is 
when all replicas are implemented according to the same 
abstract speciﬁcation, in which case a wrapper function can 
be used to translate between the local state and the group-
wise abstract state, as described in [4]. 
† Pre-determinable non-determinism: In this type of replica 
non-determinism, the values are known prior to the execution 
of a request. This type of replica non-determinism requires 
inter-replica coordination to ensure replica consistency. For 
example, it is possible to know that a random number will 
be needed during the execution of a request (e.g. from the 
speciﬁcation of the remote method) and the BFT 
mechanisms can decide which random number to use prior 
to the execution. 
† Post-determinable non-determinism: In this type of replica 
non-determinism, the values are recorded only after the 
request is submitted for execution and the non-deterministic 
values won’t be known until the end of the execution. This 
type of replica non-determinism also requires inter-replica 
coordination to ensure replica consistency. For example, it 
is virtually impossible to predeﬁne the thread interleaving 
for a multi-threaded application prior to execution. The only 
practical way is to record such interleaving at the primary 
and enforce the same interleaving at the backups. 
In this paper, we will not discuss wrappable non-
determinism further, because it can be dealt with using a 
deterministic wrapper function without inter-replica 
coordination, and also because it has been thoroughly 
studied [4]. Instead, we focus on the remaining two types of 
replica non-determinism. 
Based on whether or not a replica can verify the non­
deterministic values proposed (or recorded) by another 
replica, replica non-determinism can be further classiﬁed 
into the following types: 
† Veriﬁable non-determinism: In this type of replica non-
determinism, the values can be veriﬁed by other replicas. 
The veriﬁcation is done by comparing each value associated 
with the non-deterministic operation of one replica with that 
of another replica. Obviously, for a non-deterministic 
operation, it is impossible to expect that the two values are 
identical. For the purpose of veriﬁcation, a heuristic bound 
on the differences in the values must be predetermined or 
dynamically adjusted. If the bound is estimated incorrectly, 
a backup might mistakenly suspect the primary due to the 
out-of-bound value proposed by the primary, which might 
lead to an unnecessary view change. However, the safety 
property of the system will not be violated because of the 
mistake. 
† Non-veriﬁable non-determinism: In this type of replica 
non-determinism, the values cannot be completely veriﬁed 
by other replicas. Online gaming applications, such as 
Blackjack [21] and Texas Hold’em [22], exhibit this type of Overall, as summarized in Fig. 3, our classiﬁcation yields 
non-determinism. The integrity of services provided by four types of replica non-determinism: VPRE, NPRE, 
such applications depends on the use of secure random VPOST and NPOST. 
number generators. For the best security, it is essential to In Fig. 4, we provide an example of each type of replica 
make the choice of a random number unpredictable, which non-determinism except VPOST, because we have yet to 
prevents another replica from verifying it. identify a commonly used application that exhibits this type 
Fig. 3 Classiﬁcation of common types of application non-determinism 
Fig. 4 Examples of common types of replica non-determinism with pseudo-code, explanations, risk analyses and synopses of the solutions 
of non-determinism. Fig. 4 also includes an analysis of the 
risk of not controlling the non-determinism and a synopsis 
of the solution for each type. 
In practical applications, the execution of a request often 
involves more than one type of non-determinism, for 
example, both time-related non-determinism (which is of 
the veriﬁable pre-determinable type) and multi-threading­
related non-determinism (which is of the non-veriﬁable 
post-determinable type). Thus, considering the possibility of 
composite types of non-determinism, there can be 12 
different combinations of non-determinism types. Because 
we have yet to identify the VPOST non-determinism in 
practical applications, we only consider the following seven 
types of non-determinism: 
† VPRE: Single type with veriﬁable pre-determinable non-
determinism. 
† NPRE: Single type with non-veriﬁable pre-determinable 
non-determinism. 
† NPOST: Single type with non-veriﬁable post-determinable 
non-determinism. 
† VNPRE: Composite type with both veriﬁable pre-
determinable non-determinism and non-veriﬁable pre-
determinable non-determinism. 
† VPRE-NPOST: Composite type with both veriﬁable pre-
determinable non-determinism and non-veriﬁable post-
determinable non-determinism. 
† NPRE-NPOST: Composite type with both non-veriﬁable 
pre-determinable non-determinism and non-veriﬁable post-
determinable non-determinism. 
† VNPRE-NPOST: Composite type with veriﬁable pre-
determinable non-determinism, non-veriﬁable pre-
determinable non-determinism, and non-veriﬁable post-
determinable non-determinism. 
5 Controlling replica non-determinism 
for BFT 
In this section, we present the system model, application 
program interfaces (APIs), mechanisms for controlling 
different types of replica non-determinism for BFT, and 
informal proofs of correctness for our mechanisms. 
5.1 System model 
We consider a client-server application operating in an 
asynchronous distributed environment. To achieve liveness, 
it is necessary to assume a certain degree of synchrony. 
Like [3], we assume that the message transmission time and 
the processing time have an asymptotic upper bound. 
Both the client and the server can be Byzantine faulty, that 
is they can exhibit arbitrary faults. To achieve BFT, the server 
is replicated with 3f + 1 replicas to tolerate up to f faulty 
nodes. We assume that messages are protected by a digital 
signature or an authenticator [23] to ensure their integrity. 
We assume that the adversaries have limited computing 
power so that they cannot break the digital signatures or 
authenticators of non-faulty replicas. 
Each replica is modeled as a state machine. The replica is 
required to run, or rendered to run deterministically. The 
state change is triggered by remote invocations of the 
methods offered by the replica. In general, the client ﬁrst 
sends its request to the primary replica. The primary replica 
then broadcasts the request message to the backup replicas 
and also determines the execution order of the message. All 
non-faulty replicas must agree on the same set of request 
messages with the same execution order. In other words, 
the request messages must be delivered to the server 
application at all non-faulty replicas reliably in the same 
total order. 
To achieve the total ordering of messages, we use the BFT 
algorithm [3]. In later sections, we describe how to integrate 
our mechanisms for controlling replica non-determinism into 
the BFT algorithm, so that non-faulty replicas agree on both 
the message ordering and the non-deterministic values. 
5.2 Application programming interface 
The BFT framework is implemented as a library to be linked into 
the application code (on both server and client sides). As shown 
in Fig. 5, the client-server application and the BFT mechanisms 
(within the BFT library) interact via a set of APIs. The APIs 
contain downcalls to be invoked by the application for a 
number of purposes, for example, to initialise the BFT library 
with appropriate parameters and callback functions, to start 
the event loop managed by the BFT library, and to send 
requests to the server replicas. The APIs also contain upcalls 
to be implemented by the application, so that the BFT 
mechanisms can deliver requests to the server application, 
retrieve and verify non-deterministic values (if applicable), 
and retrieve and restore application state. 
The core upcall APIs used to control replica non-
determinism are described below: 
int propose_value(Seqno seqno, Byz_req 
*req, int *ndet_type, Byz_buffer *ndet); 
This function is called when a replica wishes to ﬁnd out the 
type of non-determinism involved in the request and to obtain 
its share of non-deterministic values (if applicable). In this 
API, seqno is the sequence number assigned to the client’s 
request, req is a pointer to the request message, 
ndet_type is a pointer to the type of non-determinism the 
replica might exhibit when executing the request, and ndet 
is a pointer to the buffer that stores the non-deterministic 
values. This function returns appropriate values to indicate if 
the call is successful. Both ndet_type and ndet are out 
Fig. 5 Positioning of the application and the BFT library, and the 
core interfaces between the two components 
parameters, which means the application is expected to set 
their values. 
int check_value(Seqno seqno, Byz_req 
*req, int *ndet_type, Byz_buffer *ndet); 
This function is invoked when a backup replica wants to 
verify the type of non-determinism and the non­
deterministic values received from the primary replica (if 
applicable). The parameters are the same as those for the 
propose_value() function. The only difference is that 
ndet_type and ndet are now used as in parameters, 
which means that the information is passed to the 
application. The veriﬁcation result is returned to the caller 
in the return value. 
int execute(Byz_req *req, Byz_rep *rep, 
Byz_buffer *ndet, int cid, bool ro); 
This function is called to deliver a request message to the 
application, together with the non-deterministic values. For 
operations with post-determinable non-determinism, this 
function is called by the primary to retrieve the recorded 
non-deterministic values. In this API, req is a pointer to 
the request message, rep is a pointer to the reply message 
to be generated by the replica, and ndet is a pointer to the 
non-deterministic values. The ndet parameter is an in-out 
parameter. Depending on the type of replica non-
determinism, it might be an in parameter, which means that 
it points to the buffer that stores the non-deterministic 
values to be used by each replica, or an out parameter when 
a replica has post-determinable non-determinism and the 
function is invoked at the primary replica. 
5.3 BFT mechanisms 
The BFT mechanisms work as follows. When the primary 
receives a client’s request, if it is ready to order the 
message, it invokes the propose_value() callback 
function registered by the application. The application 
supplies the type of non-determinism involved in the 
execution of the request and, if applicable, the non­
deterministic values. 
The original BFT algorithm is extended with two 
communication phases, namely, the pre-prepare-update 
phase and the post-commit phase. In each phase, a new 
control message referred to by the phase name is introduced. 
The pre-prepare-update message is used in the 
additional phase for the replicas to reach Byzantine 
agreement on the collection of non-deterministic values 
contributed by different replicas when NPRE is present. The 
post-commit message is used in the additional phase for 
the replicas to reach Byzantine agreement on the non­
deterministic values recorded by the primary replica after it 
has executed a request message (hence, the name post-
commit when post-determinable non-determinism is present.) 
In the following subsubsections, we provide detailed 
descriptions of the mechanisms for controlling each single 
type of non-determinism. The handling of composite types 
is straightforward. Using the same example given in Section 
4, the time-related non-deterministic values can be 
determined during the pre-prepare-update phase, and the 
multi-threading-related non-determinism can be resolved in 
the post-commit phase. Note that to cope with composite 
types of replica non-determinism, the data structure used 
to store the non-deterministic values does not need to be 
made more sophisticated because it is the application’s 
responsibility to generate and interpret the non-deterministic 
values, and for the same reason, there is no need to change 
the APIs. 
5.3.1 Controlling VPRE non-determinism: If the non-
determinism for the operation at the primary is of the type 
VPRE, the application provides the non-deterministic values 
in the ndet parameter. The obtained information is 
included in the pre-prepare message, and the message 
is multicast to the backup replicas. 
On receiving the pre-prepare message, a backup 
replica invokes the check_value() callback function. 
The replica passes the information received regarding the 
non-determinism type and data values to the application, so 
that the application can verify that (i) the type of non-
determinism for the client’s request is consistent with what 
is reported by the primary, and (ii) the non-deterministic 
values proposed by the primary is consistent with its own 
values. If either check is false, the check_value() call 
returns an error code, the backup replica then suspects the 
primary. Otherwise, the backup replica accepts the client’s 
request and the ordering information speciﬁed by the 
primary, logs the pre-prepare message and multicasts a 
prepare message to all other replicas. From now on, the 
algorithm works the same as the original BFT algorithm, 
with the exception that the prepare and commit 
messages also carry the digest of the non-deterministic 
values. The normal operation of the modiﬁed BFT 
algorithm is illustrated in Fig. 6. 
5.3.2 NPRE non-determinism: If the non-determinism 
for the operation at the primary is of the type NPRE, the 
application at the primary proposes its non-deterministic 
values. The type of non-determinism and the non­
deterministic values are included in the pre-prepare 
message, and the message is multicast to all backup replicas. 
On receiving the pre-prepare message, a backup 
replica invokes the check_value() callback function to 
verify the non-determinism type supplied by the primary 
replica (after it has veriﬁed the client’s request and the 
ordering information). If the veriﬁcation is successful, the 
backup replica invokes the propose_value() function 
to obtain its own non-deterministic values. It then builds a 
pre-prepare-update message including its own non­
deterministic values, and sends the message to the primary. 
When the primary receives 2f pre-prepare-update 
messages from different backup replicas (for the same client 
request), it builds a pre-prepare-update message, 
Fig. 6 Normal operation of the modiﬁed BFT algorithm in 
handling veriﬁable pre-determinable non-determinism 
including the 2f + 1 sets of non-deterministic values, each 
protected by the proposer’s authenticator. The pre­
prepare-update message itself is further protected by 
the primary’s authenticator. The primary then multicasts the 
message to all backup replicas. From now on, the BFT 
algorithm operates according to the original algorithm, 
except that the prepare and commit messages also carry 
the digest of the non-deterministic values, and the 2f + 1 
sets of non-deterministic values are delivered to the 
application as part of the execute() upcall. The normal 
operation of the modiﬁed BFT algorithm for this type of 
non-determinism is illustrated in Fig. 7. 
5.3.3 VPOST non-determinism: The normal operation of 
the modiﬁed BFT algorithm in handling this type of non-
determinism is shown in Fig. 8. The primary includes the 
non-determinism type (i.e., VPOST) in the pre-prepare 
Fig. 7 Normal operation of the modiﬁed BFT algorithm in 
handling NPRE 
Fig. 8 Normal operations of the modiﬁed BFT algorithm in 
handling veriﬁable post-determinable non-determinism 
message without any non-deterministic values and 
multicasts the message to the backup replicas. 
On receiving the pre-prepare message, a backup 
replica performs the check_value() upcall if it has 
veriﬁed the client’s request and the ordering information. If 
the backup replica conﬁrms the type of non-determinism, it 
proceeds to the commit phase as usual. Otherwise, the 
backup replica suspects the primary. 
When the primary is ready to deliver the request message, it 
proceeds to perform the execute() upcall and expects to 
receive both the reply message and the recorded non­
deterministic values. Once the upcall returns, the primary 
stores the retrieved post-determined non-deterministic 
values, together with the digest of the reply, into a postnd 
log (to be sent to the backup replicas), and sends the reply 
message to the client. The digest of the reply is included in 
the postnd log, so that a backup replica can verify that the 
primary has actually used the non-deterministic values to 
generate the reply. 
A post-commit phase is needed for the primary to disseminate 
the data in the postnd log to backup replicas and for all non-
faulty replicas to ensure that they have received the same set 
of values for the corresponding request. Unlike the pre­
prepare-update phase for controlling the NPRE non-
determinism type, the post-commit phase involves all of the 
steps needed for non-faulty replicas to reach an agreement on 
the non-deterministic values, which requires three rounds of 
message exchange similar to those used to determine the 
ordering of the requests under normal operation. For the NPRE 
non-determinism type, the prepare and commit phases needed 
for the non-faulty replicas to reach Byzantine agreement on 
the non-deterministic values are integrated with those for the 
corresponding request message. We cannot do so for post-
determinable non-determinism types because the ordering for 
the corresponding request has already been decided. 
A backup replica does not deliver a request message until 
Byzantine agreement has been reached on the non­
deterministic values for the request. If Byzantine agreement 
cannot be reached, or the veriﬁcation of the non­
deterministic values fails, a backup replica suspects the 
primary. Furthermore, when the backup replica produces a 
reply for the request, the digest of the reply is compared with 
that supplied by the primary. If the two do not match, the 
backup replica suspects the primary. Regardless of the 
comparison result, the backup replica sends the reply 
message to the client. It is safe to do so because the result is 
valid if all non-faulty backup replicas produce the same 
reply using the same set of non-deterministic values (even if 
they differ from the set actually used by the primary, which 
implies that the primary is lying and will be suspected). 
5.3.4 NPOST non-determinism: The handling of 
NPOST involves the same steps as those described in the 
previous subsubsection until a backup replica is ready to 
deliver the request with the post-determined non­
deterministic values, as shown in Fig. 9. 
The concern here is that a faulty primary could disseminate 
a set of incorrect non-deterministic values hoping either to 
confuse the backup replicas, or to block them from 
providing useful services to their clients. For example, 
if the non-deterministic values contain thread-ordering 
information, a faulty primary can arrange the ordering in 
such a way that it leads to the crash of a backup replica 
(e.g. if the attacker knows the existence of a software bug 
that leads to a segmentation fault), or it might cause a 
deadlock at a backup replica (the replica might perform 
Fig. 9 Normal operation of the modiﬁed BFT algorithm in 
handling NPOST 
deadlock analysis before it follows the primary’s ordering to 
prevent this from happening). 
Because, in general, a backup replica cannot completely 
verify the correctness of the non-deterministic values until it 
executes the request, it is important for the replica to launch 
a separate monitoring process prior to invoking the 
execute() call. If the replica encounters a deadlock or a 
crash fault, the monitoring process can restart the replica 
and suspect the primary. 
If it can successfully complete the execute() upcall, the 
backup replica performs the same reply veriﬁcation procedure 
as that described in the previous subsubsection, and sends the 
reply to the client. 
5.4 View change 
A faulty primary might prevent a non-faulty backup replica 
from reaching Byzantine agreement on the ordering of the 
application message and/or the associated non-deterministic 
values, in which case, a view change becomes necessary. 
Moreover, it might take several view changes for a replica 
to reach Byzantine agreement, and different replicas might 
reach Byzantine agreement in different views. It is 
important to ensure that adequate information is propagated 
from one view to another, so that if two replicas reach 
Byzantine agreement in different views, they agree on the 
same total ordering and the same non-deterministic values. 
The view change mechanism for message ordering involves 
two control messages, that is, view-change and new-
view messages. A non-faulty replica suspects the primary 
and initialises the view change if (i) its view change timer 
expires, or (ii) it cannot verify the non-deterministic values 
(for veriﬁable non-determinism), or it generates a different 
reply (for non-veriﬁable non-determinism). 
The view change message has the form k VIEW-CHANGE, 
v + 1, n, C, P, Q, PP, PQ, ilsi , where  n is the sequence 
number of the latest stable checkpoint s known to replica i, 
C is the proof of s, i is the identiﬁer of the sender, and P, 
Q, PP and PQ are deﬁned as follows: 
† P is the set of records for the requests that have been 
prepared at sender i in previous views. 
† Q is the set of records for the requests that have been pre-
prepared at sender i in previous views. 
† PP is the set of records for the requests that have been post-
prepared (on non-deterministic values) at sender i in previous 
views. 
† PQ is the set of records for the requests that have reached 
the post-pre-prepared state at sender i in previous views. 
The sets P and Q are required for requests. The sets PP and 
PQ are used to reach agreement on non-deterministic values 
for requests with post-determinable non-determinism. The 
sets P, Q, PP and PQ have the same form kdm, dnd, n, v, tl, 
where d is the digest of the request, dnd is the digest of the m 
non-deterministic value, n is the sequence number, v is the 
view number, and t is the type of non-determinism. 
A replica updates these sets of information immediately 
before sending the view-change message by using the 
records in its log. On sending the view-change message, 
the replica removes all prepare, pre-prepare, 
commit, post-pre-prepare, post-prepare, 
post-commit messages from the log, because those 
messages are no longer useful. 
When a replica receives a view-change message, it 
accepts the message, provided that all of the information in 
P, Q, PP and PQ is for view v or an earlier view. The 
replica sends a view-change-ack message to the 
primary in view v + 1 if it accepts the view-change 
message. The view-change-ack message has the form 
kVIEW-CHANGE-ACK, v + 1, i, j, dlsi, where i is the sender 
id, j is the identiﬁer of the sender of the view-change 
message being acknowledged, and d is the digest of the 
view-change message. 
The primary in view v + 1 collects each view-change 
message and the 2f corresponding view-change-ack 
messages, and stores them as an entry of an internal log S. 
Each entry of S is for a different replica. When the new 
primary receives 2f + 1 valid view-change messages, it 
constructs a new-view message using the information in S 
and multicasts the message to other replicas. The new-
view message has the form kNEW-VIEW, v + 1, V, Xlsi, 
where V contains the proof of the view change and X 
contains the checkpoint that determines the starting state of 
the new view, and a set of requests, for each sequence 
number between h and h + L, with the associated non­
deterministic values to reach agreement across views. (Here, 
h is the log’s low watermark and L is the size of the log.) 
The checkpoint and the set of requests are updated each 
time the new information is added to S. 
The primary in view v + 1 chooses the checkpoint ﬁrst 
from the information in S with the highest sequence number 
greater than h in the log of which at least f + 1 non-faulty 
replicas from the set are known to be correct. Then, the 
primary chooses a request together with the associated non­
deterministic values, if necessary, for each sequence 
number within the range h to h + L to pre-prepare in the 
new view v + 1. For pre-determinable types of non-
determinism, the same request determination procedure is 
used as that of [9]. For post-determinable types of non-
determinism, after the request is determined, a similar 
procedure is used to determine which non-deterministic 
values should be adopted. If no non-deterministic values 
can be adopted, a NULL value is included in the new-
view message and the new primary will propose new 
values when the request is re-executed. 
The primary in view v + 1 updates its own state to reﬂect 
the contents of the message after sending the new-view 
message. It fetches the state from other replicas if any 
requests, non-deterministic values, or checkpoints are 
missing. Then, it logs all requests as pre-prepared in v + 1. 
When a backup in view v + 1 receives the new-view 
message, it veriﬁes the message by checking the new view 
certiﬁcate V in the new-view message with the view-
change messages it has collected. If a backup did not 
receive a view-change message from some replica 
included in V, it asks the primary to send it a proof of 
correctness that contains the original view-change 
message and 2f acknowledgments. The backup 
subsequently veriﬁes the information by repeating the same 
procedure as that used by the primary to construct the 
new-view message. If the veriﬁcation fails, the replica 
moves to another view immediately. Otherwise, it resumes 
normal operation for each request. 
5.5 Proof of correctness 
We now provide an informal proof of correctness for our 
mechanisms. We argue here only for the correctness of 
the safety property of our mechanisms. For the liveness 
property, the correctness proof for the original BFT 
algorithm can be directly applied to our mechanisms. 
Theorem 1: If a non-faulty replica delivers a request m with a 
sequence number n and a set of non-deterministic values nd in 
view v, then no other non-faulty replica delivers m with a 
different sequence number or a different set of non­
deterministic values, and each non-faulty replica uses, or 
records (in the case of the primary), the same set of non­
deterministic values for request m. 
Proof: First, we prove that, if two non-faulty replicas deliver 
m in the same view v, then they also deliver the same set of 
non-deterministic values nd with m in the same total order. 
For the VPRE type, the non-deterministic values are 
proposed by the primary and the agreement on the values is 
carried out with the request message itself. If non-faulty 
replicas agree on the ordering of the request message, they 
agree on the non-deterministic values as well. For the 
NPRE type, the non-deterministic values are collectively 
determined in the pre-prepare-update phase, and the 
consensus on the values is achieved by the three-phase 
Byzantine agreement algorithm. Again, if some non-faulty 
replicas commit the request m, they also agree on the 
associated non-deterministic values. For the VPRE and 
NPRE types, when the request m is delivered at a non-faulty 
replica, the non-deterministic values that have been agreed 
on are also delivered and used for execution. 
For the VPOST and NPOST types, the agreement on the 
non-deterministic values among non-faulty replicas is 
guaranteed by the three-phase Byzantine agreement 
algorithm executed during the post-commit phase. When 
the request m is delivered at a non-faulty backup replica, 
the non-deterministic values associated with m are also 
delivered. The primary, if it is not faulty, must have 
recorded the non-deterministic values during its execution 
of m, and have disseminated the values to the backups 
during the post-commit phase. Therefore the same set of 
non-deterministic values are used for execution at the 
primary (if it is not faulty) and the non-faulty backup replicas. 
Next, we prove that the same statement is true if two non-
faulty replicas deliver m in different views. Without loss of 
generality, we assume replica Ri delivers m in view v, and 
replica Rj delivers m in view w, where  w . v. 
Because Ri delivered m in view v, it must have committed 
m with a sequence number n. If the replica non-determinism 
associated with m is of the type VPRE or NPRE, then Ri must 
have also committed the set nd of non-deterministic values. 
This implies that 2f + 1 replicas must have prepared m with 
n and nd. During a view change, the mechanism ensures 
that the new primary in view w must have collected the 
prepare records for m and, thus, the association of m with n 
and nd will be propagated from view v to view w. Hence, 
Rj cannot commit m to another n or nd. 
If the replica non-determinism associated with m is of the 
type VPOST or NPOST, there exist only two cases: Ri is the 
primary in view v or Ri is a backup. If Ri is the primary 
(and it is not faulty), it can deliver m before the post-
commit phase. However, this does not pose a problem 
because the Byzantine agreement for the set of non­
deterministic values associated with m (recorded at Ri) is  
guaranteed to complete in view v. We have already proved 
the correctness of our mechanism in this case. Next, we 
consider the case where Ri is a backup. It delivers the 
message m only after it has reached Byzantine agreement 
for the ordering of both m and the set nd of non­
deterministic values. Therefore the association of m with n 
and nd must have been propagated from view v to view w, 
and Rj can commit m only with n and nd in view w. This 
completes the proof. A 
6 Implementation and performance 
evaluation 
We have implemented the mechanisms described in the 
previous section in C ++  and integrated them into the 
BFT framework [1–4]. The development and test platform 
consists of 14 HP blade servers running Ubuntu Server 
9. Each of the blade servers is equipped with two Quad-
Core Intel Xeon 2 GHz CPUs with 5 GB of memory. The 
nodes are connected via a Cisco Catalyst Blade Switch 
3020 that offers full duplex 1 Gbps Ethernet connections. 
The experiments described below focus on the evaluation 
of the overhead of providing Byzantine fault tolerance to 
the non-deterministic applications in the BFT layer. The 
cost associated with recording non-deterministic values, 
verifying those values, and replaying those values in the 
application layer is not studied in this work. First, we 
present the performance evaluation results using a single 
client with respect to various types of non-determinism and 
various size non-deterministic data (by non-deterministic 
data we mean the set of non-deterministic values associated 
with a type of non-determinism). Next, we present the 
results using various numbers of concurrent clients. Finally, 
we report the impact of our mechanisms on the end-to-end 
latency during view changes. 
6.1 Basic performance evaluation 
Figs. 10 and 11 show a summary of the end-to-end latency 
and throughput measurements for a client-server application 
under normal operation for different types of non-
determinism. To avoid clutter, we have separated the results 
for single types of non-determinism from those for 
composite types of non-determinism; the results for single 
types are shown in the left ﬁgure, while those for composite 
types are shown in the right ﬁgure. In each iteration, each 
client issues a request to the server replicas and waits for 
the corresponding reply. There is no wait time between 
consecutive iterations. The size of each request and reply is 
Fig. 10 End-to-end latency for requests with different types of replica non-determinism under normal operation 
Fig. 11 Throughput for requests with different types of replica non-determinism under normal operation 
ﬁxed at 1 KByte. For each run, we measured the total elapsed 
time for 100 000 consecutive iterations at each client, and 
calculated the average end-to-end latency and throughput. 
The type of non-determinism and the size of non­
deterministic data vary in different experiments, except for 
the throughput measurements, where the non-deterministic 
data are ﬁxed at 256 Bytes for each type. Note that the sizes 
of non-deterministic data shown in Fig. 10 on the 
horizontal axis are for each type, which means that, for 
composite types, the total size of non-deterministic data is 
twice or three-times as large as those displayed. 
Except for the VPRE type, the handling of other types of 
non-determinism involves one or more phases of message 
exchange for non-faulty replicas to reach Byzantine 
agreement on the non-deterministic data. Thus, as shown in 
Fig. 10, the end-to-end latency is noticeably larger, and the 
throughput is smaller, than for the VPRE type. The end-to­
end latency difference is more signiﬁcant as the size of 
non-deterministic data involved in each operation increases. 
The results shown in Figs. 10 and 11 are obtained after a 
number of optimisations to the mechanisms described 
previously. Without these optimisations, the latency is 
signiﬁcantly larger and the throughput is much smaller, 
except for the VPRE type. These optimisations are 
described below. 
In the pre-prepare-update phase, which is needed to handle 
NPRE non-determinism, each backup replica multicasts its 
contribution of the non-deterministic data to all of the other 
replicas, and the primary decides on the collection (which 
own) to be used to calculate the ﬁnal non-deterministic 
data. Instead of multicasting the collection of non­
deterministic data, the primary disseminates the collection 
of digests of the values proposed by each replica. This 
sharply reduces the message size if the size of non­
deterministic data is large. Because each replica can log the 
non-deterministic data received from other replicas, a 
backup replica can verify the digests provided by the 
primary using its local copies. If a backup replica has not 
received the values proposed by one or more replicas 
included in the primary’s message, the replica asks for 
retransmission of the values. 
During the post-commit phase, which is needed to handle 
NPOST non-determinism, the data in the postn log is 
piggybacked with the pre-prepare message for the next 
request. In this way, the Byzantine agreement for the non­
deterministic data is reached together with that for ordering 
of the request, which reduces the number of messages 
needed to handle this type of non-determinism. Even 
though the end-to-end latency for a request increases 
slightly as a result, the system throughput is signiﬁcantly 
improved. To avoid waiting indeﬁnitely for the next 
request, the primary sets a timer. When the timer expires, 
the primary initiates the Byzantine agreement phases for the 
non-deterministic data in conjunction with a null request so 
that the existing mechanisms can be reused. 
It might be surprising to see in Fig. 10a crossover point of 
the graphs for the end-to-end latency for requests with NPRE 
non-determinism data and those with NPOST non-
includes the contributions from 2f + 1 replicas, including its determinism data. When the size of the non-determinism 
data is small, the end-to-end latency for requests with NPRE 
non-determinism is smaller than that for requests with 
NPOST non-determinism. However, as the size of the non-
determinism data increases, the latency for requests with 
NPRE non-determinism data increases rapidly and becomes 
greater than that for requests with NPOST non-determinism 
data. The reason is that, even with the optimisation, the pre­
prepare-update phase (needed to handle the NPRE type) still 
involves at least two large messages (one message per 
backup replica for its proposed non-deterministic values), 
while the post-commit phase (needed to handle the NPOST 
type) involves only one large message (sent by the 
primary). For the NPOST non-determinism type, there are 
two more rounds of message exchange than for the NPRE 
non-determinism type, which leads to a larger end-to-end 
latency when the size of the non-deterministic data is small. 
However, as the size of the non-determinism data becomes 
larger, the transmission delay for the messages that contain 
the non-determinism data begins to dominate, which results 
in a much faster increase in the end-to-end latency for 
requests with the NPRE non-determinism data, and 
eventually surpasses that for requests with NPOST non-
determinism data. The crossover for the throughput results 
shown in Fig. 11 occurs for the same reason. 
To illustrate the overhead of our mechanisms for controlling 
various types of non-determinism with respect to the original 
BFT algorithm, we show in Fig. 12a the end-to-end latency of 
each invocation when there is no replica non-determinism, 
and when each of the seven types of non-determinism (with a 
data size of 256 Bytes for each type of non-determinism) is 
present in the system. As expected, the end-to-end latency for 
VPRE non-determinism data is only slightly higher than that 
when no non-determinism is present, and the end-to-end 
latency is signiﬁcant higher in the presence of NPOST non-
determinism data, because it requires another around of 
Byzantine agreement. Nevertheless, the end-to-end latency is 
the largest (and the throughput is the smallest) in the presence 
of triple types of non-determinism (i.e., VNPRE+NPOST). 
The overhead of handling composite types of non-
determinism is expected to be the sum of the overhead of 
handling each single type of non-determinism. To verify 
this, we computed the expected latency for each composite 
type by superimposing the overhead of each individual type 
of non-determinism involved, and compared it with the 
measured latency. As shown in Figs. 12b–e, the computed 
latency is virtually identical to the measured result, 
conﬁrming our expectation. 
6.2 Performance evaluation under heavier loads 
To investigate the performance of our framework under 
heavier loads, we use multiple concurrent clients that 
Fig. 12 End-to-end latency for various non-determinism types and data sizes 
a End-to-end latency comparison without non-determinism, and with seven types of non-determinisms (VPRE, NPRE, NPOST, VNPRE, VPRE + NPOST, 
NPRE + NPOST and VNPRE + NPOST) represented by the numbers from 1 to 7, respectively 
b–e Comparisons for the measured latency and the expected value obtained by superimposing the overhead of individual non-determinism for the following 
composite types of non-determinism (VNPRE, VPRE + NPOST, NPRE + NPOST, VNPRE + NPOST), respectively 
Fig. 13 End-to-end latency for requests with different types of replica non-determinism in the presence of multiple concurrent clients under 
normal operation 
Fig. 14 Throughput for operations with different types of replica non-determinism in the presence of multiple concurrent clients under normal 
operation 
Table 1 End-to-end latency during view changes 
Non-determinism type End-to-end latency, s 
128 KB 256 KB 512 KB 1024 KB 2048 KB 4096 KB 
BFT with no ND 5.303915 
VPRE 5.303713 5.303834 5.304212 5.304548 5.30449 5.304659 
NPRE 5.304126 5.304294 5.304016 5.303665 5.30423 5.304159 
NPOST 5.304225 5.304572 5.304388 5.304486 5.304382 5.304593 
issue requests at the replicated server. Each of the clients 
sends 100 000 request consecutively, where the size of the 
non-deterministic data is ﬁxed at 256 Bytes. The results are 
summarised in Figs. 13 and 14. As for the basic 
performance evaluation, we present the results for the single 
types of non-determinism and those for the composite types 
of non-determinism separately. 
Interestingly, the end-to-end latency results shown in 
Fig. 13 also contains a crossover point, that is, the end-to­
end latency for the requests with NPOST non-determinism 
data is greater than that for NPRE non-determinism data 
when the number of concurrent clients is less than 
7. However, starting with eight concurrent clients, the 
latency for the requests with NPOST non-determinism data 
falls below that of the requests with NPRE non-determinism 
data. The crossover can also be seen in the throughput 
measurement results in Fig. 14, although it is less obvious. 
The reason for this crossover is that, for requests with 
NPOST non-determinism data, when there is a sufﬁcient 
number of concurrent clients, virtually all post-determinable 
non-deterministic data are piggybacked with the pre-
prepare messages for other requests, rather than being 
sent as separate messages. The piggybacking mechanism 
effectively prevents the rapid increase in the end-to-end 
latency when the load on the system becomes higher and, 
similarly, helps to improve the throughput for requests with 
NPOST non-determinism data. 
6.3 Impact on end-to-end latency during view 
changes 
So far, we have reported the experimental results for normal 
operation. In this section, we present the results that 
characterise the impact of our mechanisms on the 
performance of the BFT tolerance framework during view 
changes, that is when the primary is faulty. We choose to 
use the end-to-end latency measured at the client as the 
metric to evaluate the impact of our mechanisms. In our 
experiment, a single client is used, and some requests 
generated by the client are instrumented, so that they trigger 
the crash of the primary, which leads to a view change. 
Consequently, the end-to-end latency for such requests 
includes the round-trip latency during normal operation, the 
time it takes to detect the primary failure, and the view 
change latency. During the experiment, a 5 s view change 
timer, and a 150 ms message retransmission timer are used. 
Furthermore, a view change always succeeds and no 
message is lost during the view change. 
The experimental results for various scenarios (different 
non-determinism types, including the scenario without any 
non-determinism, which is labeled BFT with no ND, and 
different sizes of non-deterministic data) are summarised in 
Table 1. As can be seen, the end-to-end latency remains 
virtually the same for all scenarios. This is expected 
because the handling of non-deterministic data during a 
view change has minimum impact on the view change 
latency. According to the modiﬁed view change mechanism 
described in Section 5.4, only the digest of the non­
deterministic data is piggybacked onto the view-change 
and new-view messages. Therefore the handling of non-
determinism has virtually no effect on the performance of 
the view change. During our experiment, no message is 
lost. The view change latency might be larger if a message 
that contains non-determinism data is lost and has to be 
retransmitted. 
7 Conclusion and future work 
In this paper, we have presented the design and 
implementation of a BFT framework for non-deterministic 
applications. First, we described a novel classiﬁcation of 
common types of application non-determinism based on 
two criteria: (i) whether or not the values associated with the 
non-deterministic operations can be determined prior to the 
execution of a request, and (ii) whether or not the values 
proposed by one replica can be veriﬁed by another replica. 
This approach led to four types of non-determinism. 
Furthermore, we highlighted the risks incurred when such 
non-determinism is not controlled or not controlled properly 
by means of examples. 
Based on the classiﬁcation and risk analyses, we presented 
a set of mechanisms to control these types of non-
determinism in a systematic and efﬁcient manner. Our 
contributions here are 3-fold. First, we observed that a 
heuristic bound must be used to verify a non-deterministic 
value (if it is veriﬁable), and argued that the safety property 
of the system is not violated if the bound is estimated 
incorrectly. Second, for non-veriﬁable pre-determinable 
operations, we noted that the collective inputs from 2f + 1 
replicas are required. Third, we illustrated a provisioning 
method that handles non-veriﬁable post-determinable 
operations, so that the system can quickly recover replicas 
that have been damaged by malicious non-deterministic 
values sent by the primary. We also presented proofs of 
correctness for our mechanisms. 
The implementation of these mechanisms is carried out 
by extending the well-known BFT framework presented in 
[1–4], which has very limited support for replica non-
determinism. We have conducted extensive experiments to 
evaluate the performance of our prototype implementation. 
We have shown that our mechanisms incur only a moderate 
runtime overhead. 
Our current implementation requires the application 
to provide a number of callback functions to identify and 
verify non-deterministic operations in the code for each 
remote method, and to record and replay such operations. 
It might require substantial expertise and time, on the 
part of the application developers, to analyze the 
application code and implement the callback functions 
correctly. To alleviate such a burden on the application 
developers, in future work, we plan to design tools that help 
analyze the source code for non-deterministic operations 
and that transparently record and replay non-deterministic 
operations. 
The problem of having to deal with non-veriﬁable non-
determinism is unique to the Byzantine fault model. 
Besides our current approach, we plan to explore an 
alternative solution, based on coin-tossing [24], that  
generates a common secret among the replicas. In this 
scheme, a threshold signature is used where each replica is 
dealt a share of a private key and the replicas collectively 
generate a group digital signature, which is later mapped to 
a common secret. The beneﬁt of this approach is the 
reduced communication cost (no explicit Byzantine 
agreement on the common secret is necessary). However, 
the computation cost for generating a threshold signature 
might be signiﬁcant. We aim to develop a guideline on 
when it is best to use which scheme, and eventually to add 
the capability to our frame such that the best scheme is 
selected dynamically based on the type of applications and 
runtime context. 
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